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Abstract: In the intensifying public debate about limiting the harmful effects of climate change, many 
global corporations have recently articulated so-called “net-zero” goals for reducing and ultimately 
eliminating their own greenhouse gas emissions.  We first examine the details of the carbon 
reduction goals articulated by seven large firms in different industries. The individual reduction goals 
are shown to vary substantially in terms of specificity and scope, largely due to variations in the 
measurement of carbon footprints. Particular sources of variation arise from how “gross emissions” 
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With the quest for rapid decarbonization gaining global momentum, a sizeable number of major 
corporations have recently begun to report more granular information regarding their own carbon 
emissions. For the most part, these disclosures have been voluntary and forward-looking, pertaining 
to both current and anticipated future emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases 
into the atmosphere. The disclosing firms frequently “pledge” to achieve a carbon net-zero position 
by a particular date several decades into the future, most commonly the year 2050. The number of 
firms with net-zero targets more than doubled last year, increasing from 500 in 2019 to 1,000 in 
2020.1 As such, individual corporate goals complement the carbon reduction targets set by national 
governments in the form of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) in international climate 
treaties, like the Paris 2015 agreement.  
In this chapter we first summarize the specific plans articulated by seven major corporations for 
reducing their Corporate Carbon Footprints (abbreviated as CCF from here on). Our sample is not 
intended to be representative for the entire  population of firms that have become active in this 
regard. Instead, our selection aims to cover a broad range of industries, including manufacturers and 
distributors of consumer products, energy companies, as well as internet technology firms. We then 
compare and discuss key features of the decarbonization plans put forth by these seven firms to 
highlight substantial differences regarding the specificity and measurement of the articulated goals. 
Our discussion points to considerable variation in the use of so-called carbon offsets. We also discuss 
alternatives for making  CCF disclosures more transparent and credible in the future, including the 
possibility of such disclosures becoming mandatory rather than voluntary. 
Information on the carbon reduction plans disclosed by individual firms has been collected by 
multiple analysts, including Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF), the Carbon Disclosure Project 
and Science-based Targets. Figure 1 below replicates a graph taken from BNEF, illustrating the CCF 
reduction plans of five global oil and gas companies.2 A common feature of these projections is that 
firms plan to achieve a “net-zero” position by a certain year---that is, their carbon footprint, 
measured as Scope 1 plus Scope 2 emissions, is projected to go to zero at some point in time within 
the next 30 years.3 As discussed below in detail, the net-zero goal frequently allows for credits to be 
subtracted from the firm’s emissions to obtain a measure of net-emissions.  As shown in Figure 
1companies like  Repsol also set “milestones” that project their net carbon footprint at one or 
several intermediate points in time between the present and 2050. We note that in drawing this 
graph, BNEF apparently makes the implicit, and ultimately central, assumption that a firm’s carbon 
footprint decreases linearly between any two milestones. 
CCF reduction plans have gained considerable attention in the recent public discussion about limiting 
the damaging effects of climate change. This interest reflects the growing concern that despite all 
protestations about the threat posed by climate change, the world economies have thus far failed to 
collectively bend the overall curve of annual CO2 emissions, at least prior to the arrival of the COVID-
19 pandemic in 2020. In the absence of effective policies, such as direct emission regulations and/or 
carbon pricing, corporate commitments to reduce emissions are seen as a potentially significant 
commitment and coordination mechanism for enabling the world to limit the overall global 
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temperature increase on earth to a range of 1.5-2°C, relative to pre-industrial levels
 
 Figure 1  illustrates the CO2 reduction goals of five oil and gas firms, in terms of their Scope 1 and 2 
emissions. Source: Based on data from Bloomberg New Energy Finance (2021).5 
The projected paths of direct (Scope 1) emissions of all economic entities (i.e., firms, households, 
governmental agencies) can, at least in principle, be aggregated to a forecast for the carbon 
emissions path for the global economy. Such aggregate carbon emissions trajectories have been 
forecast by numerous analysts and observers. Figure 2, for example, reproduces a graph from a 
recent McKinsey white paper. 
 
 
Figure 2 illustrates a business-as-usual and a 1.5°C pathway for global carbon emissions up to the 
year 2050 Source: McKinsey7 
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Climate scientists for the IPCC projected in 2018 that in order to have at least a two-thirds chance 
of limiting the temperature increase to 1.5°C, total cumulative anthropogenic emissions would have 
to stay within a 420 Gt carbon budget. That budget would increase to 570 (840) Gt in order to 
maintain at least a one-half (one-third) probability of keeping the temperature increase to 1.5°C.8 
Aggregate carbon emissions paths, like the one shown in Figure 2, suggest the analogy of the 
atmosphere as a “bathtub” for anthropogenic carbon emissions. The carbon budget determines the 
size of this bathtub which would overflow if the cumulative future emissions i.e. the area under the 
curve, were to exceed the size of the tub.  
The shape of the projected emissions curve is clearly crucial, with total cumulative emissions 
being  larger for a concave (delayed reductions) as opposed to a convex (accelerated reductions) 
shape, holding the endpoints of the curve fixed. This observation illustrates the elementary point 
that when individual corporations set goals for their own future carbon footprints, it is not only the 
endpoints between today and the projected net-zero date that matter, but equally so the projected 
path connecting the endpoints. Milestones effectively  trace out the shape of the anticipated 
individual firm-level trajectories and thereby yield a more precise prediction of the total projected 
cumulative emissions..  
Two central questions in this context  are why firms issue voluntary decarbonization pledges and 
why the set of firms joining this bandwagon has expanded rapidly in the last couple of years. 
Economists have long pointed to climate change as a prime illustration of the Tragedy of the 
Commons. Accordingly, the terrestrial atmosphere is a public good (bathtub), yet economic agents 
only internalize a minor fraction of the social cost associated with their own activities that 
deteriorate the public good.9 The recent pace of global carbon emissions and the more frequent 
occurrence of extreme weather events have arguably accentuated the prospects of an impending 
crisis for this public good. The decarbonization goals articulated by large, multi-national firms 
quantify their intended contribution to the preservation of the public good. While the stated goals 
are voluntary at this point in time, their achievement in the future may  be driven at least partly by 
future carbon regulations. 
There is increasing evidence that firms face pressure from multiple stakeholder groups to 
articulate their contribution toward the public good of an atmosphere in which the concentration of 
CO2 remains within acceptable limits. These stakeholder groups potentially include the firm’s 
customers, managers, directors and, for publicly listed firms, the broader investment community.10 
Some institutional investors, like the New York City Pension Fund and BlackRock, have become 
particularly vocal in this regard. For instance, BlackRock’s Larry Fink stated in his 2020 letter to CEOs 
that climate change will be a “defining factor in companies’ long-term prospects” and that BlackRock 
“will be increasingly disposed to vote against management and board directors when companies are 
not making sufficient progress on sustainability-related disclosures and the business practices and 
plans underlying them.”11 The 2021 letter to CEOs becomes more explicit when it calls on all 
companies in BlackRock’s portfolio “to disclose a plan for how their business model will be 
compatible with the net-zero economy” and adds “We expect you to disclose how this plan is 
incorporated into your long-term strategy and reviewed by your board of directors.”12 
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In the face of growing pressure from both internal and external stakeholders, there appear to be 
clear  benefits from joining the group of firms that have articulated net-zero pledges. At the same 
time,  such pledges may not entail substantial costs in the minds of either the firm’s management or 
its shareholders. Obviously, any commitment to a net-zero goal by the year 2050 is well beyond the 
personal planning horizon of current corporate officers. Furthermore, as argued below, currently 
stated net-zero pledges frequently offer considerable “wiggle room” in so far as there are no 
restrictions on the types of carbon offsets that are eligible for subtraction from the firm’s gross 
carbon emissions. A recent article in The Economist13 points out that the average price for carbon 
offsets in the voluntary carbon markets was a mere $3 per metric ton of CO2 in 2018. At these rates, 
the oil majors represented in Figure1 could meet the net-zero target today by paying annually 
somewhere in the range of $60-90 million dollars each, while leaving their Scope 1 and 2 emissions 
unchanged. 
  
Corporate Carbon Reduction Goals: Select Examples 
 
Google 
Google LLC is a technology company that specializes in internet-related services and products, 
which include online advertising technologies, a leading internet search engine, cloud computing, 
software, and some hardware products. The firm’s 19 operational campuses across 21 locations for 
its data centers in the U.S., Europe, South America and Asia achieved $161 billion in sales revenue in 
2019. The firm defines its operational emissions to include all Scope 1 and 2 emissions. Regarding 
Scope 3, the company includes emissions related to business travel, candidate travel, and employee 
commuting.14 Google has articulated its carbon neutrality commitment for these operational 
emissions15 and has pronounced itself carbon neutral since 2007 because its annual carbon footprint, 
measured according to its own methodology, has been less than or equal to zero.  
Google’s primary approach to reducing emissions is through energy efficiency improvements (at 
its data centers), generating on-site solar power and investing in renewable power generation plants 
in various locations. For offsite renewable power plants (mostly wind and solar PV), Google will 
typically enter into long-term purchasing agreements with an offtaker, allowing Google to match 
100% of its annual electricity consumption with renewable energy generation. By the end of 2019, 
Google had 5.5GW of renewable power generation capacity under contract, the majority of which 
was in the same grid locations as its data centers. Nonetheless, a significant share of the energy 
generated by Google’s renewable energy facilities is sold to third parties, such as utilities. To bring its 
remaining carbon footprint (CCF) to zero, Google purchases carbon offsets it deems to be of “high-
quality.” Typical carbon offset projects include landfill gas capture, agricultural methane capture, and 
deforestation avoidance credits. 
In September 2020, Google announced new decarbonization targets, the primary one being 
carbon-free energy on a “24-by-7” basis for its direct operations by 2030.16 To calibrate the size of 
this goal, in 2020 only 61% of all electricity used by the firm was matched with regional, carbon-free 
resources on an hourly basis, with high/low examples being Oklahoma and Singapore, at 96% and 3% 
respectively.17 The firm has acknowledged the challenge of achieving its 24/7 goal, and has outlined 
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potential enabling technologies. These include demand response mechanisms and demand matching 
for its data centers and the use of clean dispatchable power generation, e.g., advanced nuclear, 
enhanced geothermal, low-impact hydro, long-duration storage, green hydrogen, and carbon capture 
and sequestration.  
An additional major goal – which the company pronounced to be achieved on the day of the 
announcement in September 2020 – was to eliminate all legacy carbon emissions via purchased 
carbon offsets, effectively making the sum of Google’s past CCFs zero. 
 
Xcel 
Xcel Energy, Inc. (Xcel) is an investor-owned electricity and natural gas company that operates 
through four regulated utility subsidiaries in eight states across the Midwest and Western U.S. The 
firm serves 3.7 million electricity and 2.1 million natural gas customers and in 2019 achieved 
revenues of $11.5 billion. In December 2018, Xcel set the goal of providing its retail and wholesale 
customers with 100% carbon-free electricity by 2050, with an intermediate goal of an 80% CO2 
reduction for all electrical energy delivered by the year 2030, compared to 2005 baseline levels.18 
This pledge pertains to emissions from Xcel-owned generating plants (Scope 1) and electricity 
purchased from other producers that is ultimately supplied to the firm’s customers (Scope 3).  
Xcel follows the common practice of reporting CO2 equivalents to aggregate the emissions of all 
greenhouse gases, such as methane, nitrous oxide and several fluorocarbons in a composite 
emissions measure usually termed CO2e.19 For Xcel, the combustion of fossil fuels comprises 99% of 
generated electricity CO2e emissions, while the remaining 1% is attributable to methane emissions.20 
By the end of 2020, Xcel had already achieved a 50% emissions reduction from its 2005 baseline,21 
which in absolute terms amounted to ~40 MTCO2e.22  
The company has outlined investment and operational changes that are intended to enable its 
net-zero trajectory.23 Primarily, this entails investing in solar and wind generation with a projected 
2030 energy mix of 60% renewables, 10% nuclear, with the remaining quantity equally divided across 
natural gas and coal fired facilities. Xcel’s strategy broadly entails a mix of natural gas, wind, solar, 
and “advanced technologies,” while maintaining existing nuclear generation facilities and reducing 
the operation of existing coal plants. From an electricity demand perspective, the firm plans to 
undertake end-customer energy efficiency programs and strategic electrification including the build-
out of electric vehicle infrastructure. Notably, carbon offsets are not considered as an instrument for 
achieving Xcel’s carbon commitments. To meet its 2050 goals beyond 2030, the company advocates 
for research and development to enable the final 20% emissions reductions, as the current suite of 
technology options are not viewed as commercially viable for “providing customers reliable, 
affordable clean energy.”24 
 
REI 
Recreational Equipment, Inc. (REI) is an American retail and outdoor recreation services 
corporation with 168 locations, 13,000 employees and ~$3B net sales in 2019. REI has declared that 
it will become “carbon neutral” with respect to its operations and products sold under its own brand, 
beginning in 2020 emissions. The supply chain tied to products sold under the REI brand account for 
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approximately one quarter of the company’s ~ 1MtCO2e total CCF.25 In addition, the firm has 
committed to reduce its total CCF (Scope 1-3) by 55% by 2030 relative to a 2019 baseline.26 This will 
entail reducing the emissions associated with the nearly 1,000 product items carried by the retailer, 
constituting approximately at least 42% of REI’s total footprint. 
REI first achieved carbon neutrality in its direct operations in September 2020 through a 
combination of ongoing capital investments in buildings, energy purchase changes and carbon 
offsets.27 Since 2006, the firm has embarked on upgrades to its retail, distribution, and administrative 
buildings, including HVAC replacements eliminating the use of freon and the installation of energy 
efficiency measures such as LED lighting. Beginning in 2014, REI operations have been powered by 
100% renewable energy achieved through a combination of onsite generation, utility green tariffs, 
and renewable energy credits. Finally, to eliminate the remaining CO2 from direct operations, REI 
joined Climate Neutral in late 2020, an organization that measures corporate CO2 footprint of brands 
and then facilitates the purchase of carbon offsets through its project pool.28  
 
Unilever 
Unilever plc is a multinational consumer goods company, organized into three main divisions – 
foods & refreshments, home care, and beauty and personal care. Selling  400 products  in 190 
countries, the firm’s revenue in 2019 was approximately  $60 billion. Unilever has publicized its 
Sustainable Living Plan (USLP) since 2010, which sets time-bound goals for achieving, among other 
things, reductions in carbon emissions. In 2019, Unilever reported a GHG footprint of ~60 MtCO2e, 
98% of which was attributable to Scope 3 emissions.29 The USLP sets two marquee commitments, the 
first pertaining to  no carbon emissions from Unilever’s operations (Scope 1 and 2) by 2030. The 
second goal, set relative to a 2010 baseline, is to reduce by the year 2030 the firm’s  GHG footprint 
across the entire value chain  by 50% on a “per consumer use basis”.30 This carbon intensity measure 
is based on the quantity of CO2e allocated per single portion, use or serving of a Unilever product for 
one person.31 It is based on the amount of product sold to the consumer in combination with the 
recommended dose/use or habits data.32 In 2019, this intensity measure was set at 45.5 grams of CO2 
per use. Importantly, this figure includes the emissions attributed to the consumer use of products 
sold by Unilever (one of the categories among the Scope 3 emissions), accounting for ~66% of 
Unilever’s CCF in 2019. 
To meet its climate goals, Unilever intends to use 100% renewable energy to power all firm-
controlled operations. The company also plans to rely increasingly on sustainable sourcing of 
commodities such as palm oil, soy, paper/pulp, and reformulating products with the objective of 
using fewer input ingredients.33 
In June 2020, the firm released an additional statement to “fight climate change and protect 
nature as part of a new integrated business strategy.” Specifically, Unilever additionally forecasts to 
achieve net-zero emissions from all products by 2039, covering all associate emission from the 
sourcing of the materials to the point of sale.34 However, this new goal does not include the 
consumer use stage. One key pillar to achieving the 2039 goal is for the firm to attain a 
“deforestation-free” supply chain by 2023, through investment in a combination of restricted 
supplier contracting and investing in satellite imagining and data processes for monitoring and 
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verification. Finally, Unilever has stated that it intends to balance any residual emissions in the supply 
chain by 2039 through carbon offsets that are either purchased or self-generated. 
 
United Airlines 
United Airlines, Inc. operates ~1,400 aircraft, with 4,900 daily flights to 361 airports across the 
world. Total operating revenue in 2019 was ~$43 billion. In December 2020, United pledged to 
reduce its CO2e emissions by 100% by 2050 on an absolute basis.35 The firm’s climate strategy is 
focused primarily on mitigating its aircraft emissions related to fuel combustion, as ~81% United’s 
annual CCF (42 MtCO2e) results from jet fuel consumed by its own aircraft (Scope 1). United also 
provides regional transportations service under the brand United Express, within which six separately 
owned airlines operate short-and-medium feeder flights.36 The jet fuel emissions from these flights 
(Scope 3) accounts for ~17% of United’s CCF. Accordingly, a total of ~98% of the firm’s corporate 
emissions stem from jet fuel combustion.37  
United has outlined  three broad approaches to achieve its climate pledge: increasing fuel 
efficiency, reducing carbon intensity of fuels, and removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. 
Aircraft body upgrades support fuel efficiency. For example, United reported that the 
implementation of Boeing’s split scimitar winglets reduces fuel consumption by 2%. Regarding 
carbon intensity of fuel, the firm has entered into long term contracts to purchase sustainable 
aviation fuel, which can reduce lifecycle emissions by 60%. In particular, United has made a $30 
million equity investment in Fulcrum BioEnergy and entered into a long-term supply agreement for 
90 million gallons per year for 10 years.38,39  
United Airlines is also bound by the International Civil Aviation Organization, the UN agency for 
aviation Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA). Starting in 
2027 for U.S. domiciled air carriers, CORSIA calls for international aviation to offset part of its CO2 
emissions through the reduction of emissions outside of the international aviation sector, essentially 
through carbon offsets. Examples of offset projects mentioned there include those that reduce 
emissions from electricity generation, industrial processes, and agriculture. CORSIA’s goal is to keep 
global net CO2 emissions from international aviation at 2019 levels going forward. This goal has been 
labelled  “carbon neutral growth”.40  
United Airlines has indicated that the CORSIA offsets will ultimately be insufficient41 and 
therefore the company will seek to remove all of its carbon permanently using direct-air-capture 
technology.42 In late 2020, United made a multi-million-dollar investment in 1point5, a development 
company formed by Oxy Low Carbon Ventures and Rusheen Capital Management to finance and 
deploy Carbon Engineering’s large-scale direct air capture technology.43 As a first demonstration, 
1point5 is to deliver a facility located in the Texas Permian Basin that will capture and permanently 
sequester 1 MtCO2/year when operational, expected sometime in 2022 or 2023.44  
 
BP 
The British multinational oil and gas company BP plc operates in all segments of the oil and gas 
industry with  investments in renewable energy increasing as of late. In 2019 BP achieved ~$277 
billion in revenue based on operations in over 80 countries. That year, the company produced 2.6 
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million barrels of oil per day.45 Due to the sheer volume of its fossil fuel production, the firm reports a 
sizeable  carbon footprint of ~55 MtCO2e from direct operations in 2019. An additional 360 MtCO2e 
in Scope 3 emissions account for the combustion of oil and gas sold by the company. This number 
reflects BP’s equity share in joint ventures. In February 2020, BP articulated a net-zero goal to be 
achieved no later than 2050.46 This goal is seen as part of a new strategy to transform BP from an 
International Oil Company to an Integrated Energy Company.47 
Known as the “Net Zero Ambition,”48 the 2020 targets can be divided into direct operations, 
upstream production activities, and downstream product use. BP seeks to achieve net-zero emissions 
for its direct operations (Scope 1 and 2), and net-zero emissions from its upstream production of oil 
and gas (Scope 3)49 on an absolute basis by 2050, with a 20% reduction by 2025. Regarding its other 
Scope 3 emissions, BP has pledged to reduce the carbon intensity of the products it sells by 50% by 
2050, with a 5% reduction goal by 2025.50 The carbon intensity measure is calculated on a per unit of 
energy basis (e.g. tCO2 per MJ of energy) and pertains to the estimated lifecycle emissions associated 
with the production, processing, transportation and use of  of all marketed products.. These products 
include fuels, natural gas, and electric power supplied to customers. The general expectation 
expressed by BP is that  the absolute level of emissions associated with marketed products will grow 
up to 2030, even as the carbon intensity falls. Beyond 2030, the firm projects that its total emissions 
will fall, in part because of the company’s intention  to limit its engagement in the  oil and gas 
sector.51 
To meet its targets, BP aims to increase the capacity of its renewable energy projects. For 
instance, by the end of 2020, it had deployed 3.3GW of renewable energy projects and amassed a 
~11 GW development pipeline (20% solar, 80% offshore wind). The firm has also stated that it will 
increase low-carbon investments to $5 billion per year by 2030, up from current levels of $0.5 billion. 
These funds will be used to scale up deployment in mobility electrification, sustainable fuels, 
hydrogen energy, and carbon capture, utilization, and sequestration technologies. BP will seek 
divestments to lower its CCF and to develop technology that reduces its carbon footprint from 
refining operations. To meet its shorter-term targets BP intends to not rely on carbon offsets. 
However, natural climate solutions will be eligible as carbon offsets to achieve the company’s aims 
beyond 2030.   
Through its Target Neutral activities, BP already purchases carbon offsets for its own operations 
and on behalf of its customers to help them achieve their carbon targets. For its own operations, 
some offsets are used to comply with obligations under mandatory emissions schemes, such as the 
California Cap-and-Trade Program.52 For example, a BP subsidiary with operations in California 
purchased offsets for 1.7 MtCO2e as part of its requirement to meet the state’s Cap-and-Trade 
emissions trading scheme for the 2015-2017 compliance period.53 Beyond compliance markets, BP 
sees carbon offsets as a growing industry. In December 2020, the firm acquired Finite Carbon, at the 







The computer software supplier Microsoft Corporation had $143 billion in sales revenue in 2020. 
Microsoft’s cloud operations were distributed across more than 100 data centers in 54 regions 
delivering computing services in 140 countries. In 2020, the firm accounted for a CCF of ~11MtCO2, 
including Scope 1-3 emissions.55 In January 2020, the firm announced it would be carbon negative by 
2030 and remove all the CO2 it has cumulatively emitted since its founding by  2050.56 Broadly, the 
firm has identified four levers to achieve this goal: i) an internal carbon fee, ii) data center energy 
efficiency and exclusive reliance on renewable energy, iii) supply chain partnering and coordination, 
and iv) the use of CO2 removal technologies.  
Microsoft has been charging an internal carbon fee since 2012 on Scope 1 and 2 emissions and 
business air travel (Scope 3). In 2020, the fee was increased to $15/tCO2 for all business groups and 
now also applies to all Scope 3 emissions, though initially at a lower rate.57 The company has 
provided the following quantitative reduction goals for the coming decades:58 reduce Scope 1 and 2 
emissions by 2025 through energy efficiency and 100% renewable energy, eliminate diesel 
generators as a backup power source for data centers by 2030 and replace them with batteries or 
hydrogen fuel cells, and electrify the 1,800+ campus operations vehicle fleet. By 2030, the firm also 
aims to reduce its Scope 3 emissions by 55% through an updated supplier code of conduct, requiring 
GHG emissions disclosure, and implementation of an audit management system to track progress in 
the emissions by its suppliers. Starting in 2021, supplier emissions will become an evaluation 
criterion for the purchasing departments at Microsoft. 
To zero out residual emissions and become carbon negative on an annual basis by 2030, 
Microsoft is investing in carbon removal solutions rather than so-called avoidance offsets. In this 
context,, the company commented: “As we shifted our focus from carbon offsets to carbon removals, 
we entered a relatively new landscape. We could no longer rely as heavily on carbon registries to 
validate project quality, because their standards were designed almost exclusively to measure and 
verify the claims of projects that avoid or reduce emissions, and we experienced a lack of consistency 
in how the standards address key criteria. We are eager for standards to address these issues in their 
crediting systems. For now, although we did look to existing standards for some guidance, we largely 
needed to set our own course.”59 In July 2020, Microsoft issued a request for proposals to source 
carbon removal projects, with an initial focus on “nature-based climate solutions due to pricing and 
availability.” Microsoft secured 1.3 MtCO2e removal for 2021 from 15 projects, with 99% of 




A common feature of the corporate decarbonization plans discussed in the preceding section is 
that firms operationalize their CO2 reduction goals in terms of an annual flow variable which we 
represent by: CCFt = Et – Ot. Here, Et represents “gross emissions” in year t and Ot represents “offsets” 
in that year. We refer to CCFt interchangeably as the firm’s corporate carbon footprint or its net-
emissions in year t. Firms with “net-zero” pledges project that their adopted measure of CCFt will go 
to zero by a target date, frequently the year 2050. As argued in the previous section, Microsoft and 
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Google have articulated far more ambitious goals to the extent that they seek to eliminate all legacy 
emissions from the firm’s past. For Microsoft, this will require the sum of all CCFt starting in 1985 and 
ending in 2050 not to exceed zero. This more demanding criterion, also put forth by Google, is 
sometimes referred to as “climate neutrality.” 
There is a host of measurement issues pertaining to both gross emissions and offsets.60 As 
illustrated in the conceptual framework shown in Figure 3, the purchase of offsets frequently relies 
on a marketplace in which suppliers make projects available that corporate emitters then claim as 
offsets. In the current environment, buyers of these offsets have wide latitude in determining the 
eligibility of particular offset projects.
 
Figure 3 depicts a  conceptual framework for determining a firm’s corporate carbon footprint. 
 
Gross Emissions 
There appears to be general agreement that all direct (Scope 1) CO2 emissions from flue gases 
and tailpipes emanating from a firm’s production and transportation activities are to be included in 
Et. Our sample of corporate carbon pledges above also suggests that it is common practice to include 
Scope 2 (indirect) emissions based on the production of energy, i.e., electricity, heating and cooling 
that is consumed by the firm. In service industries, like internet technology or financial services, this 
second component of Et is frequently the dominant part of a firm’s CCFt. The main argument for 
including these indirect emissions in Et is that, depending on the jurisdiction, businesses have some 
control over the energy mix they buy and the choice of their energy suppliers. At the same time, 
though, there is the obvious issue of double counting in the overall economy: a firm’s Scope 2 
emissions are also included in the Scope 1 emissions of its energy suppliers. As a consequence, any 
year-over-year reduction in the direct emissions by the energy supplier will also be counted as an 
improvement in Et by the party buying the energy.  
Issues of double counting become even more prevalent in connection with Scope 3 emissions.61 
Not surprisingly, the supply chain report of the Carbon Disclosure Project estimates that the ratio of 
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indirect supply chain emissions relative to direct emissions is 10.9 for firms in the retail industry, yet 
this ratio is only 0.4 for firms in the fossil fuel industry. 
For the sample of firms covered in the previous section, we note that there was considerable 
variation as to which of the many categories among the Scope 3 emissions firms are willing to include 
in their measure of Et. While Excel, BP or Unilever include multiple Scope 3 emission categories, 
companies like Google only recognize employee travel and commuting.62 Similarly, as noted in 
Section 2, the utility Xcel excludes from its CCF the emissions associated with the combustion of the 
natural gas that the firm sells to its customers.  
For manufacturing industries in which firms assemble multiple complex components in their 
products, the boundaries of the Scope 3 emissions become inherently “fuzzy” as one moves up the 
value chain across the different tiers of suppliers, who in turn supply multiple customers. The issues 
associated with the inclusion of Scope 3 emissions are well illustrated in connection with an 
automotive company like Toyota.63 According to the GHG Protocol (Corporate Value Chain, Scope 3, 
Accounting and Reporting Standard), Toyota should estimate the carbon content of all components 
going into their vehicles including an “appropriate allocation” for the use of capital goods, upstream 
transportation, and distribution.64 Clearly, this is a task of daunting complexity for an automobile 
consisting of approximately 30,000 individual parts. Consistent with these concerns, a recent white 
paper by the Rocky Mountain Institute concludes that “Scope 3 emissions are not well defined for 
individual industries”.65  
On the product use side, the GHG protocol suggests for Toyota to estimate the CO2 emissions 
from combusting the fuel used by the vehicles sold over their lifetime and to recognize these lifetime 
emissions in the year of sale. On this last prescription, the GHG protocol appears to conflate stock- 
and flow variables. To witness, when the company acquires a car for use in its own operations, it 
would presumably recognize the attendant (Scope 1) tailpipe emissions on an ongoing annual basis 
rather than upfront in the year of acquisition.  
As noted at the outset of this chapter, some firms not only set net-zero targets but also specify 
milestones for partial reductions at intermediate points in time. To account for growth (or 
contraction) of the business over multiple decades, a meaningful criterion for achieving the 
milestone goal must put the CCF measure in relation to a suitable activity measure, such as output or 
sales. The absolute CCFt metric is then replaced by a carbon intensity ratio with the activity variable in 
the denominator to be chosen. For companies with a relatively homogeneous product line, physical 
measures of output may be suitable, but even then the reporting entity will retain considerable 
flexibility in choosing a favorable measure for the denominator of its carbon intensity metric.66 As 
described in the previous section, Unilever addresses this issue by imputing a standard quantity of 
CO2 per individual portion (use). This quantity is the same for Unilever’s entire range of consumer 
products. To measure reductions in the carbon intensity of diversified industrial conglomerates, it 
seems that only a financial aggregator, like sales or cost of goods sold, will be practical as the activity 






We refer to a carbon offset as one metric ton of CO2 either not emitted into or removed from the 
atmosphere in that year. Somewhat like indulgences sold by the Catholic Church in past centuries, 
offsets can effectively lower a firm’s reported carbon footprint (its environmental “sin registry”). It is 
widely acknowledged that there are significant differences in the types of offsets currently traded in 
voluntary carbon markets. These differences are reflected in the wide range of transaction prices – 
ranging from $0.10 to $780/ton, with an average of $3 per metric ton. The carbon offset supplier 
SilviaTerra, for instance, works with timber farmers who are paid to delay cutting down trees for one 
year. In contrast, some buyers of carbon offsets contract with a third party to capture CO2 from the 
ambient air (direct air capture) and then sequester the CO2 captured in geological formations for long 
periods of time, say 1,000 years.  
The offsets traded in current voluntary credit markets can be grouped into avoidance and 
removal offsets. Avoidance offsets are generated from projects that lead to a reduction in emissions 
from current emissions sources. They account for tons of CO2 that would have been emitted (relative 
to a projected baseline) but were avoided in that year due to an intervention. Avoidance offsets 
typically involve contractual agreements with another party. These offsets can originate in nature or 
through reliance on a technology-based intervention. Nature-based avoidance offsets can be 
generated, for instance, if a forest, which from a carbon storage perspective is in a steady state, is 
preserved rather than logged. Large-scale project developers such as the Nature Conservancy and 
GreenTrees pay landowners who have a stated intention, and plausible economic motive, of cutting 
down forests to not do so – thus avoiding the emissions of deforestation. Technology-based 
avoidance offsets hinge on the use of a production process which reduces the amount of emissions in 
comparison to the status quo. Applicable examples here include renewable energy projects, green 
cement, or clean cook stoves.  
Our earlier discussion touched upon Google’s approach of relying on technology-based 
avoidance offsets, for instance by financing renewable power plants that supply clean energy to the 
grid. As a consequence, the emissions from fossil fuel energy in that location are displaced by a 
renewable power plant owned or financed by Google. Even though Google will frequently not 
consume the clean energy generated by the plant, the company performs an effective “electron 
swap” for accounting purposes and recognizes offsets from clean power production based on the 
carbon intensity of the grid in the location of the renewable power facility. Issues of double counting 
across the economy will again arise in this context if the company that buys the energy from Google’s 
renewable plant, say a utility like Xcel, also takes credit under its own CCF measure for the clean 
electrons sold to its customers. 
In contrast, removal offsets are generated by projects that actively remove carbon dioxide from 
the atmosphere, and then store the gas for a period of time. Removal offsets also comprise nature- 
and technology-based solutions. Nature-based removal offsets sequester additional carbon in the 
biosphere, for instance, through reforestation, afforestation, biochar, ocean fertilization, and soil 
carbon sequestration. Locus Agriculture provides an example in this context, offering a microbial 
stimulant product that farmers spray to increase yields and sequester 2-3 additional tons of CO2 per 
acre. Locus is the first company offering such payments to farmers in the U.S., with the offsets 
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bought by Shopify. Technology-based removal offsets involve the capture of CO2 followed by storage 
outside of the biosphere. The Swiss company Climeworks is a prime example in this context as it 
captures CO2 directly from the ambient air and then permanently sequesters it underground in 
basaltic rock formations.67 Figure 4 illustrates both nature-based (storage insider the biosphere) and 
technology-based (storage outside the biosphere) carbon removal mechanisms. 
 
 
Figure 4 illustrates alternative carbon removal mechanisms that subsequently store the carbon 
dioxide either within the biosphere, e.g., forests, or outside the biosphere, e.g., geologic formations. 
Source: CDR Primer68 
 
In voluntary carbon markets, buyers who seek to offset their emissions are matched with 
suppliers who have projects that either avoid CO2 emissions or remove them. A growing ecosystem is 
developing to facilitate trades on these voluntary carbon markets - consisting of brokers, exchanges, 
registries, and verification bodies. Brokers are frequently boutique firms that buy offsets and bundle 
them to the specific needs of buyers. Exchanges, in contrast, are marketplaces that list a wide range 
of offsets available for sale. Brokers such as South Pole and BlueSource have built reputations for 
listing high quality offsets of all types, while a firm like Puro.Earth offers only removal offsets.  
Brokers work with end-suppliers to scope out price/quantity agreements, bring in registries and 
third-party certifiers. Buyers can also purchase offsets directly from suppliers (“over the counter” 
purchases).69 Recently there has been an increased trend towards over-the-counter purchases, 
especially from larger firms like Stripe and United Airlines that seek direct interactions with specific 
suppliers deemed to be of high quality. Once an offset is purchased, it is retired to avoid the 
possibility of multiple parties receiving credit. 
Carbon markets first came to prominence in 1997 when the Kyoto Protocol established carbon 
credits as a mechanism for countries and firms to offset their emissions. The volume of offsets 
supplied (issued) and bought (retired) has seen rapid growth over the past few years. As shown in 
Figure 5, volume supply doubled between 2018 and 2019 (138 million)70, and then again grew by a 
third from 2019 to 2020 (181 million).71 Currently, the vast majority of these offsets are avoidance 
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offsets, which tend to be cheaper than removal offsets. Just over half of all offsets (53%) were 
nature-based in 2019.72 
 
Figure 5 shows the volume of carbon offsets that were issued, and the volume of offsets that were 
purchased and thereafter retired. Source: McKinsey73 
 
The average price of an offset has been declining, from an average of $7 per metric ton of CO2 in 
2008 to around $3 in 2019.74 Overall, transaction prices vary dramatically based on the degree of 
verification and the geographic location of the offset project. The graphic in Figure 6 illustrates the 
wide range of offset prices observed in the voluntary carbon markets. As noted above, the prices of 
offsets can approach $800 per ton for select over-the-counter transactions.
 
Figure 6 shows the range of prices for traded carbon offsets, depending on their technology source 
and location, e.g., Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) in Africa. 
Source: Bloomberg NEF, CBL 
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In light of Figure 6 it is instructive to estimate the cost of the technology-based avoidance offsets 
that a company like Google incurs when it builds (finances) a renewable power plant in some offsite 
location. As described above, the renewable energy is frequently sold to third parties and Google 
claims the carbon offsets by effectively swapping the carbon-free energy produced for “grey” grid 
power consumed by its data centers. 
 The unit economics of a renewable power plant is proportional to the difference between the price 
per MWh under the Power Purchasing Agreement (PPA) (negotiated between the investor and the 
offtaker) and the lifecycle cost of generating one MWh of electricity, the so-called Levelized Cost of 
Electricity (LCOE).75 For a solar photovoltaic installation in California, for example, a reasonable value 
in the current environment would be PPA = 30 dollars per MWh and LCOE = 32 dollars per MWh. The 
facility would then be unprofitable (negative NPV) at the rate of $2 per MWh for the investor 
(Google), but each MWh of clean electricity will generate carbon offsets. The magnitude and cost of 
the resulting offsets depends on the carbon intensity of the grid in which the solar facility operates. 
For the California grid, the average amount of CO2 emitted is .2 tons/MWh. The cost of offsetting one 
metric ton of CO2 for the investor therefore is $10 (i.e., 2/0.2= 10). This cost would shrink to one 
third, that is, $3.33 per ton of CO2, if the solar facility were to operate in the state of Colorado where 
the grid emits on average 0.6 tons/MWh. In effect, these types of avoidance offsets become cheaper 
for the investor if the same “clean” electrons are counted as displacing “grey” electrons with higher 
CO2 origin. 
The wide range of carbon offset prices observed in voluntary carbon markets suggests significant 
quality variances. While the Taskforce on Scaling Voluntary Carbon Markets (TSVCM) reports that 
90% of credits do adhere to verification through certification bodies such as Verified Carbon 
Standard or American Carbon Registry, such verification arguably represents only a minimum 
standard. There does not appear to be a bright line standard for what constitutes a “high quality” 
carbon offset. Certain qualitative criteria mentioned repeatedly can be summarized under the 
acronym PLAN: Permanence, Leakage, Additionality and Negativity.  
Permanence, or durability, of an offset refers to the amount of time that the CO2 is expected to 
be stored rather than released into the atmosphere. A company like SilviaTerra deliberately focuses 
on short-term durability when it offers one-year contracts to landowners – paying them to delay 
cutting down a tree for at least one more year. Such contracts can obviously be renewed and have 
the advantage of avoiding the long lead times required to verify and accrue credits in connection 
with some nature-based offsets.76 Typically, technology-based removal offsets have longer 
permanence, as carbon is stored outside of the biosphere with relatively low risk of being released in 
the foreseeable future. Some buyers, such as Stripe, have set permanence thresholds of at least 
1,000 years for the offsets they purchase. CarbonPlan, a non-profit focused on improving the 
functioning of voluntary carbon markets, seeks to quantify the tradeoff between permanence and 




Figure 7 quantifies on a logarithmic scale the association between the permanence (duration) 
and the price of carbon offsets. Source: CarbonPlan78 
 
Leakage in connection with avoidance offsets would occur if credits are issued because the 
supplier agrees to preserve a particular forest or natural habitat, including the carbon stored there, 
yet the supplier releases the same amount of CO2 by taking down another natural habitat in another 
location. Leakage is closely related to the criterion of Additionality. The requirement here is that the 
carbon reduction would not have happened without the intervention generating the offset (see also 
Matt Bannick’s Chapter 6 for a discussion of additionality). Additionality is harder to establish with 
avoidance offsets, as, by definition, the offset hinges on a counterfactual claim: without the 
intervention a specific amount of carbon dioxide would have been emitted at this location. There has 
been increased press on the additionality issues with nature-based solutions. Bloomberg Green 
reported that a number of nature-based avoidance credits were issued by Green Trees and Nature 
Conservancy on forests that were never under threat of being cut down.79 For removal credits, 
especially technology-driven ones, additionality will frequently be easier to establish. It appears 
implausible that the suppliers of these offsets would extract  CO2 from the ambient air or the flue 
gases from an industrial facility and then sequester the CO2 geologically without the monetary 
incentive of selling the corresponding offsets. Microsoft announced in 2020 a shift from buying 
avoidance nature-based offsets to only buying removal offsets, specifically because additionally was 
difficult to establish for the avoidance offsets the company had historically purchased. 
Finally, the Negativity criterion postulates that the emissions generated by implementing an 
offset project are properly subtracted from the total emissions claimed by the offset. In connection 
with a direct air capture plant, this would require that the project generates credits in the amount of 
CO2 directly removed from the atmosphere minus the CO2 that was emitted to generate the energy 
required to power the capture plant. 
Carbon offset buyers like Stripe and Microsoft have articulated their own criteria for what 
constitutes a high-quality offset. Stripe has committed to spending $1 million annually on removal 
offsets. The company led a transparent procurement process to buy offsets directly from suppliers, 
only from projects that could remove and store carbon outside of the biosphere for at least one 
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thousand years. The first year of purchases went to just four projects, with Stripe paying between 
$75-775 / ton of carbon removed, up to 258x the current average price of offsets. Beyond the 
immediate offsets generated, Stripe’s impact concept emphasizes the idea of bringing the price of 
removal technologies down the cost learning curve. As mentioned above, Microsoft will for now only 
acquire removal offsets, but does not exclude nature-based removal offsets with shorter durability. 
Numerous other firms with net-zero commitments are taking a similar path, shunning avoidance 
credits in the short-run and investing instead directly in removal technologies for the long run.80 As 
discussed above, United Airlines is a company in that group.  
Not everyone agrees that the best way forward is to focus exclusively on removal offsets. The 
TSVCM calls for reliance on avoidance credits in the short term, as they are currently the most cost-
efficient way to reduce overall emissions subject to appropriate verification. Only when  the cost of 
removal offsets has been brought down sufficiently, and there has been sufficient focus on 
abatement of new emissions, does the TSVCM call for a shift towards removal technologies that 
would offset the remaining “hard to abate” emissions. The TSVCM also estimates demand for carbon 
credits would need to increase by a factor of 15x by 2030, and a factor of 100x by 2050 to achieve 
the 1.5°C global warming limit. 
It remains an open question at this stage to what extent voluntary carbon markets will also grow 
because of firms’ mandatory carbon compliance obligations, such as the EU Emission Trading Scheme 
(ETS) or the California Cap-and-Trade system. Under both of these regulatory schemes, the obligated 
firms must generally obtain allowances for their local Scope 1 emissions. The California Cap-and-
Trade system allows firms to substitute allowances by carbon offsets obtained from approved supply 
sources, up to an 8% ceiling of the emissions regulated by the state of California. Companies like BP 
are taking advantage of this alternative compliance option. The recent acquisition of a majority stake 
in Finite Carbon, a nature-based offset project developer, will presumably enable BP to secure offsets 
at favorable spot- and future prices.81 The offsets purchased in this manner therefore satisfy both 
BP’s regulatory requirement and the achievement of its voluntary CCF reduction goals. 
 
Improving the Transparency and Accountability of CCF Disclosures 
Recent years have witnessed a surge of firms making the kinds of carbon reduction pledges 
summarized  above. Since these voluntary disclosures thus far exhibit considerable variation in terms 
of specificity and scope, the immediate question going forward is what  reporting format would make 
the disclosures more credible and allow the public to hold firms accountable for their earlier 
projections. Put differently, in the current disclosure environment there do not seem to be any 
meaningful tradeoffs for firms to join the “net-zero by 2050 club,” assuming they do not anticipate 
having to issue progress reports in the foreseeable future.82 
It is well established that the internal management control systems of major corporations evolve 
around a comprehensive system of standard setting combined with subsequent comparisons of the 
standards with actual results achieved.83 In the context of corporate carbon reporting, the initial 
disclosure, say in the year 2019, regarding a firm’s anticipated CCFt  trajectory can be viewed as the 
initial standard. The credibility of this initial disclosure would be enhanced considerably if it was 
accompanied by a commitment to provide  updated trajectories that relate actual results to the 
19 
earlier projections. Figure 8 illustrates the idea of time-consistent carbon trajectories for a 
hypothetical setting in which the firm commits to updates on actual emissions annually and updated 
forecast trajectories every five years. Another assumption maintained in this illustration is that the 
initial and the updated trajectories all have a 2050 net-zero goal as well as milestones that are 10 






Figure 8 provides a hypothetical illustration of a time-consistent emission trajectory 
 
In the hypothetical scenario considered in Figure 8, the firm would commit in 2020 to issue a 
total of six carbon footprint trajectories over the next thirty years. Beginning in 2025, each trajectory 
would splice together the actual results since 2020 with a forecast segment (dashed line), each one 
five years shorter than the previous one. Thus, subsequent disclosures would take the actual carbon 
footprint in that year as the initial baseline value, allowing for dynamic performance assessments 
that compare multiple standard values, issued at five-year intervals in the past, to the actual result 
achieved in a given year. As illustrated in Figure 5, the trajectory forecast every five years is likely to 
change over time. Furthermore, actual values need not be consistent with any of the previous 
forecasts for that particular year.85  
As discussed above, any measure of CCFt that includes indirect emissions (Scope 2 and 3) as part 
of gross emissions is subject to economy-wide double-counting. Such measures will also be afflicted 
by the subjective choice individual companies make in including different categories of their Scope 3 
emissions. Similarly, as argued in the previous section, there is currently considerable variation in the 
quality of offsets, in particular avoidance offsets, that companies are willing to include in their 
measure of Ot. It would therefore be more informative to the general public  if, beyond their current 
carbon footprint disclosures, firms were to report their Scope 1 net-emissions which we denote by 
20 
CCF1t = E1t - O1t. This measure takes a firm’s direct emissions and subtracts only removal offsets with a 
certified high sequestration duration, e.g., carbon capture combined with geological sequestration. 
As such, the two components of the metric allow for an apples-to-apples comparison of tons of CO2 
“permanently” released into and removed from the atmosphere in a particular year.  
Our advocacy for this “core” carbon footprint measure is based on the observation that it is 
ultimately the sum of all CCF1t, added up across all economic entities and years up to some horizon 
date T, that determines the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere at the horizon 
date T.86 Put differently, the concentration of CO2 equivalents in the atmosphere and therefore the 
global temperature increase relative to pre-industrial levels, hinges on the cumulative value of all 
CCF1t when added up across all economic entities and years up to the planning horizon.87 
Standardized measurement of carbon footprints would, of course, have to be in place if reporting 
were to become mandatory. To that end, U.S. companies have an obligation to report their Scope 1 
emissions to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.88 For a wide range of industrial sectors, 
European installations are obligated to report their annual Scope 1 emissions to the European Union 
Transaction Log under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS).89 
In addition, publicly listed firms in Britain have, beginning in 2013, also been mandated to 
disclose their annual direct (Scope 1) and indirect (Scope 2) GHG emissions as part of their annual 
financial reports.90 Corporate GHG emissions are to be reported in tons of CO2 equivalents, with the 
conversion factors for gases other than CO2 published annually by the British government. The 
disclosure mandate does not prescribe a specific method for calculating GHG emissions, but it 
requires the use of “robust and accepted methods” and recommends a “widely recognized 
independent standard”. 
Several recent academic studies have examined whether the UK reporting mandate had a real 
effect insofar as the reporting obligation induced firms to reduce their emissions more quickly than 
other firms not subject to the regulation.91 Downar et al. (2021) hypothesize the emergence of such a 
real effect due to stakeholder pressure. Essentially, the carbon footprint figures publicized in a firm’s 
annual report would create a “pillory” for showing subsequent improvements. Yet, the UK mandate 
may actually not have entailed the reporting of substantial additional public information because 
many of the treated firms were already engaged in voluntary carbon reporting to the CDP (see 
Grewal, 2021). Furthermore, as noted above, all European installations covered by the EU-ETS 
scheme already had to report their Scope 1 emissions to the European Union Transaction Log, and 
that information has always been in the public domain.  
Using a difference-in-differences empirical design, Downar et al. (2021) estimate that UK firms 
subject to the carbon reporting mandate under the 2013 Act, subsequently decreased their Scope 1 
emissions by an additional 8% relative to a control group of European firms not subject to the British 
regulation. The authors interpret their finding as evidence that reporting on current emission leads 
to additional transparency beyond the information already available through other channels. In 
anticipation of having to disclose their carbon footprint in subsequent years, firms apparently did feel 






As part of  the public debate about mitigating the damaging effects of climate change, a growing 
coalition of global corporations has recently issued voluntary forecasts regarding their intended 
contributions towards driving overall global CO2 emissions to zero. At the same time, an increasing 
number of national governments have articulated net-zero targets, as illustrated in Figure 7 below. 
While for some companies, like REI, these efforts have always been part of their mission (even their 
corporate DNA), many global players in carbon intensive industries have joined this group only 
recently, resulting in the recent surge of new pledges. Increased stakeholder pressure appears to be 
a major motivation for for firms to making these emission reduction pledges. At the same time, our 
assessment is that the various existing pledges leave substantial “wiggle room,” largely because of 
scope, horizon, and measurement issues. This may allow some firms to wear the “green mantle” 
without having to make significant efforts beyond those that will emerge anyhow from more 
stringent carbon regulations in the future. 
 
 
Figure 7  shows the growing share of emissions for which national governments have set net-zero 
targets. Source: Bloomberg New Energy Finance93  
 
Our analysis has focused on how corporate carbon footprints are measured. In that context, the 
selective inclusion of indirect emissions that fall into the bucket of Scope 3 emissions under the 
international GHG protocol create the most significant variation in corporate CO2 reporting. A Further 
latitude with these pledges arises because firms in different industries will adopt different metrics for 
the carbon intensity of their product and operations. Yet carbon intensity measures are essential in 
order to quantify decarbonization progress at intermediate milestones, prior to firms arriving at their 
net-zero goal points several decades into the future 
Carbon offsets, in particular avoidance offsets, are another variable that create substantial 
variation and latitude in comparing the carbon footprint reductions actually achieved94. As the set of 
firms embracing the “net-zero by 2050” goal has rapidly expanded, the supply of avoidance offset 
providers appears to have grown correspondingly, leading to a situation where avoidance offsets 
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trade on average at extremely low prices per metric ton of CO2. Unless firms either declare that 
avoidance offsets are excluded from their CCF measures or restrict attention to removal offsets, 
subject to carefully defined durability standards, carbon reduction pledges will  be achievable at 
negligible expense. In that sense, we fully agree with the sentiment expressed by Microsoft’s Brad 
Smith in stating “… we need to get real on carbon math. The current methods used for carbon 
accounting are ambiguous and too discretionary. We need clear protocols to ensure that progress 
reported on an accounting statement is truly progress in the real world.”95  
Aside from carbon footprint measurement issues, we argue that the informativeness and 
accountability of corporate carbon pledges would be enhanced if companies were to update these 
projections at regular time intervals. The resulting collection of emission reduction curves would 
allow the public to examine not only how forecasts of future emissions have changed over time, but 
also to what extent intermediate goals at milestones have been met or missed. Firms could self-
commit to such time-consistent carbon emission projections. The existing mandate to report 
concurrent Scope 1 and 2 emissions for listed firms in the UK also suggests that extended reporting 
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